#### MIND THE EXTERNALITY GAP: COMPARING RAIL TRANSIT CAPITAL AND OPERATING COSTS TO CONSUMER BENEFITS

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#### COSTS AND BENEFITS OF RAIL TRANSIT: **HIGHLY CONTENTIOUS**

# **Policy Analysis**

#### **Defining Success** The Case against Rail Transit by Randal O'Toole

#### **Executive Summary**

Over the past four decades, American cities have spent close to \$100 billion constructing rail transit systems, and many billions more operating those sistems. The agencies that spend taxpuor dolkes building these lines almost invariably call them successful even when they go an average of 40 percent over budget and, in many cases, carry an insignificant number of riders. The people who rarily or never ride these lines but still have to pay for them should ask, "How do you define maximal"

This Policy Analysis uses the latest government data on scores of rail transit systems to evaluate the systems' value and usefulness to the public using six different tests:

· Profitability: Do ttal fants cover operating. No system passes all of these tests, and it fact few -max<sup>2</sup>

- · Ridenbuy: Do new rail lines significantly increase transit eidenship?
- · Cont-Effectiveness: Are new call lines less expensive to operate than huses prividing service at similar frequencies and speeds?
- . The "Cable Car" Test: Do rail lines perform as well as or better than cable cars, the oldest and most expensive form of mechanized land-based transportation?
- The Economic Development Test: Do new rail lines truly stimulate expectate development? . The Transportation Network Test: Do rail lines add to or place stresses upon existing
- transportation networks?
- of them pass any of the tests at all.







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Raise My Taxes, Please!

Evaluating Household Savings From High Quality Public Transit Service 26 February 2010

> Todd Litman Victoria Transport Policy Institute



#### Summary

High quality public transit consists of service sufficiently convenient and comfortable to attract travel that would otherwise be by automobile. This report uses data from U.S. cities to investigate the incremental costs and benefits of high quality transit service. It indicates that high quality public transit typically requires about \$268 in additional subsidies and \$104 in additional fares annually per capita, but provides vehicle, parking and road cost savings averaging \$1,040 per capita, plus other benefits including congestion reductions, increased traffic safety, pollution reductions, improved mobility for non-drivers, improved fitness and health. This indicates that residents should rationally support tax increases if needed to create high quality public transit systems in their communities. Current planning practices tend to overlook or undervalue many of these savings and benefits and so result in underinvestment in transit quality improvements.

#### Tadd Litman ib 2010

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#### LITERATURE MAP

METHODOLOGICAL RIGOR



If consumer benefits alone do not justify the high cost of rail transit, what would the external value of a passenger mile have to be to do so?

## RB = UB + FR - CC - OC + EB

Where RB = Rail Net Annual Benefits FR = Fare Revenues CC = Annualized Capital Costs OC = Operating Costs EB = Net External Benefits

Set RB to 0 and solve for EB.

#### **"The Externality Gap" = CC + OC – FR – UB**

FARE REVENUES	+
(OPERATING COSTS)	—
OPERATING LOSS	
(CAPITAL COSTS)	_
TOTAL NET COSTS	
CONSUMER BENEFITS	+
EXTERNALITY GAP	?
NET ECONOMIC BENEFITS	0

#### SYSTEMS IN STUDY

	City	Agency
1. 2.	Atlanta Baltimore Boston	Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority Maryland Transit Administration Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
4. 5.	Buffalo Charlotte	Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority Charlotte Area Transit System
6.	Chicago	Chicago Transit Authority
7.	Dallas	Dallas Area Rapid Transit
8.	Denver	Denver Regional Transportation District
9.   10	Los Angeles Miami	Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority
10.		Miami-Dade Transit
11.	Minneapolis	Metro Transit
12.	New York	MTA New York City Transit
13.	Newark/Jersey City/Trenton	New Jersey Transit Corporation
14.	Philadelphia	Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
15.	Pittsburgh	Port Authority of Allegheny County
16.	Portland	Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District of Oregon
10	Sacramento	Sacramento Regional 'Iransit District
10.	Salt Lake City	Utan Transit Authority
19. 20	San Diego	San Diego Metropolitan Iransit System
20.		San Flancisco Municipal Kaliway
21.	San Francisco	San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District
22.	San Jose	Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority
23.	San Juan	Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority
24.	Washington, DC	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

# SYSTEMS IN STUDY



#### $\mathsf{EB}=\mathsf{CC}+\mathsf{OC}-\mathsf{FR}-\mathsf{UB}$

	<u>Average</u> <u>System</u>	<u>Average</u> per PMT	<u>Total in</u> Billions
FARE REVENUES	\$0.18	\$0.21	\$3.9
(OPERATING COSTS)	(0.66)	(0.39)	(\$7.1)
OPERATING LOSS	(\$0.48)	(\$0.17)	(\$3.2)
(CAPITAL COSTS)	-	-	-
TOTAL NET COSTS	-	-	-
CONSUMER BENEFITS	_	_	_
EXTERNALITY GAP	-	_	_
NET ECONOMIC BENEFITS	-	_	_

## **Operating loss per PMT by Agency**

	Agency	Op Loss
1.	MTA New York City Transit San Francisco Bay Area Papid Transit District	.1074102
۲• ا ۲	San Fiancisco Bay Alea Rapid Hansit District San Diego Metropolitan Transit System	1199913
4.	Denver Regional Transportation District	.1472077
5.	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority	.1814085
6.	Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority	.1841911
7.	Chicago Transit Authority	.1993877
8.	Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority	.216/48
9.   10	Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority	·2268611   2409751
TO•		.2400/JI
11.	Utah Transit Authority	.2472688
12.	Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District of Oregon	.2718581
13.	Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority	.3575824
14.	Sacramento Regional Transit District	.4404929
15.	Miami-Dade Transit	.48634//
16.	Dallas Area Rapid Transit	.4968237
17.	Charlotte Area Transit System	.6025766
18.	Maryland Transit Administration	.6059452
19.	Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority	.8618044
20.	San Francisco Municipal Railway	.8755004
21.	New Jersey Transit Corporation	.9644889
22.	Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority	1.050253
23.	Port Authority of Allegheny County	1.121352
24.	Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority	1.312702

#### $\mathsf{EB} = \mathsf{CC} + \mathsf{OC} - \mathsf{FR} - \mathsf{UB}$

**Estimating Annualized Capital Costs** 

Used capital cost data on 55 investments over the past 4 decades providing:

100% of costs: 9 systems 80% to 99%: 9 systems 54%: 1 system 0 to 10%: 5 systems

Costs Annualized at 2.2% Amortization Rate over 50 years.

#### $\mathsf{EB} = \mathsf{CC} + \mathsf{OC} - \mathsf{FR} - \mathsf{UB}$

Estimating Annualized Capital Costs for the 5 Systems with Insufficient Cost Data:

Average the inflation-adjusted capital expenditures over the past 17 years (available from the NTD).

Annual Capital Cost Estimates by Method for Older Systems with Investment Data

SYSTEM	Investment Data	NTD Estimate	Difference
SF BART	\$321 Million	\$355 Million	9.6%
DC METRO	\$694 Million	\$425 Million	-38.8%

#### $\mathsf{EB}=\mathsf{CC}+\mathsf{OC}-\mathsf{FR}-\mathsf{UB}$

	<u>Average</u> System	<u>Average</u> per PMT	<u>Total in</u> Billions
FARE REVENUES	\$0.18	\$0.21	\$3.9
(OPERATING COSTS)	(0.66)	(0.39)	\$7.1
OPERATING LOSS	(\$0.48)	(\$0.17)	(\$3.2)
(CAPITAL COSTS)	(\$0.71)	(\$0.33)	(\$6.1)
TOTAL NET COSTS	(\$1.19)	(\$0.51)	(\$9.3)
CONSUMER BENEFITS	-	-	_
EXTERNALITY GAP	-	-	-
NET ECONOMIC BENEFITS	_		

#### SMOOTHED DISTRIBUTION OF COSTS BY SYSTEM



#### Net Rail Cost per PMT by Agency

	Agency	Net Cost
1.	San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District MTA New York City Transit	.3392514
3. 1	San Diego Metropolitan Transit System	.4631574
4.	Metro Transit	.4878086
5.	Denver Regional Transportation District	.5023656
6.	Chicago Transit Authority	.5657239
7.	Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority	.5884137
8.	Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority	.5890374
9.	Utah Transit Authority	.5933548
10.	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority	.6044832
11.	Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District of Oregon	.6690745
12.	Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority	.7467733
13.	Sacramento Regional Transit District	.7897594
14.	Dallas Area Rapid Transit	.8901268
15.	Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority	1.02479
16.	Miami-Dade Transit	1.064788
17.	Maryland Transit Administration	1.385065
18.	San Francisco Municipal Railway	1.63248
19.	Charlotte Area Transit System	1.690542
20.	New Jersey Transit Corporation	2.333046
21.	Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority	2.377767
22.	Port Authority of Allegheny County	2.658739
23.	Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority	2.750571
24.	Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority	3.469359

#### $\mathsf{EB} = \mathsf{CC} + \mathsf{OC} - \mathsf{FR} - \mathsf{UB}$

Estimating User Benefits. Assumptions: Linear demand elasticity Point elasticity at p\*,Q\* = -0.3, -0.6, or -1.0



Log-Log Panel	Regressions of D	eterminants of PM	TT (6 Years, 23 s	ystems)
	(1) BE	(2) OLS #	(3) RE #	 (4) FE #
Fare per	-0.650*	-0.445**	-0.327**	-0.283*
PMT	(0.036)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.047)
Controls				
stjobs ln	1.095***	0.966***	0.597**	0.410*
stpop In	0.0790	0.245	0.367*	0.938+
park ln	0.538**	0.297**	0.114	-1.415**
freqln	0.734**	0.413**	0.536***	0.507*
netpop ln	0.477	0.462	0.204	0.198
netjobs ln	-1.340+	-0.937*	-0.213	-0.254
mph ln	-0.214	1.174*	1.293**	0.891+
fuel ln	-1.525	0.185+	0.226*	0.256*
dist ln	0.381	-0.228	-0.454*	1.708*
gdp ln	0.515	-0.00310	-0.00957	0.00967
new corr	0.678	-0.0555	-0.0579+	-0.0359
_cons	1.343	0.546	-0.409	-8.533
N	 135	135	135	135
R-sq	0.994	0.972	0.959	0.803
rho			0.723	0.992
# Models 2, 3 p-values in pa	, and 4 cluster s arentheses	tandard errors by	/ system.	

+ p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

#### $\mathbf{EB} = \mathbf{CC} + \mathbf{OC} - \mathbf{FR} - \mathbf{UB}$

	<u>Average</u> <u>System</u>	<u>Average</u> per PMT	<u>Total in</u> Billions
TOTAL NET COSTS	(\$1.19)	(\$0.51)	(\$9.3)
CONSUMER BENEFITS (e=3)	\$0.31	\$0.35	\$6.5
CONSUMER BENEFITS (e=-1.0)	\$0.09	\$0.11	\$1.9
EXTERNALITY GAP (LOW)	\$0.88	\$0.16	\$2.8
EXTERNALITY GAP (HIGH)	\$1.09	\$0.40	\$7.3
NET ECONOMIC BENEFITS	\$0	\$O	\$0

# EXTERNALITY GAP BY SYSTEM (LOW ESTIMATE)



# EXTERNALITY GAP BY SYSTEM (LOW ESTIMATE)



# EXTERNALITY GAP BY SYSTEM (LOW ESTIMATE)



## **"Externality Gap"** per PMT by Agency

	Agency	e = -0.3	-1.0	PMT   Percent
1.	San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District	0161117	.2326425	.0793106
2.	MTA New York City Transit	0106258	.2433041	.547422
3.	Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority	.067074	.4324484	.0403492
4.	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority	.1386206	.4647244	.0897738
5.	San Diego Metropolitan Transit System	.2125003	.3879603	.0113296
6.	Denver Regional Transportation District	.22948	.4205	.0073388
7.	Metro Transit	.2424222	.4141927	.0033431
8.	Chicago Transit Authority	.2788251	.4796543	.0648259
9.	Utah Transit Authority	.3637786	.5244819	.003894
10.	Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority	.3824804	.6374854	.0265544
 11.	Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District of Oregon	.3979011	.5877225	.0105987
12.	Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority	.4501123	.5469233	.0324912
13.	Sacramento Regional Transit District	.5172024	.7079923	.0046981
14.	Dallas Area Rapid Transit	.7383175	.844584	.008309
15.	Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority	.8293792	.9661665	.0287349
 16.	Miami-Dade Transit	.9094784	1.018195	.0077832
17 <b>.</b>	Maryland Transit Administration	1.120712	1.305759	.0066195
18.	San Francisco Municipal Railway	1.153354	1.488743	.013089
19.	Charlotte Area Transit System	1.483523	1.628436	.0007153
20.	New Jersey Transit Corporation	1.972736	2.224953	.0053126
 21.	Santa Clara Vallev Transportation Authority	2.114722	2.298854	.002 <u>9826</u>
22.	Port Authority of Alleghenv County	2.305204	2.552679	.0018208
23.	Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority	2.36107	2.633721	.002452
24.	Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority	2.985662	3.32425	.0008007

# **Externality Gap per PMT (low) = \$0.16 with NYC.**



# **Externality Gap** per PMT (low) = \$0.35 without NYC.



#### TRANSIT EXTERNALITIES

What is a reasonable externality gap?

Dependent on the counterfactual.

What happens to the annual 18 billion passenger miles:
1)Stop Travelling
2)Take Bus
3)Drive
4)Other (taxi, walk bike, private paratransit)

Do municipalities invest in additional roadway or bus service?

#### TRANSIT EXTERNALITY ESTIMATES

EXTERNALITY GAP (Average PMT) \$0.16 to \$0.40 EXTERNALITY GAP (Average System) \$0.88 to \$1.09

#### **External Cost of Car Mile**

Los Angeles: \$0.31; Washington DC, \$0.25 (during peak). Parry and Small (2009) New York: \$0.39; Los Angeles: \$0.83; San Jose: \$0.38 Harford (2006)

#### **Bus Costs**

More or less expensive?

The average net operating loss per passenger mile for bus is \$0.32 higher for bus than for rail.

#### Non-trip Costs

Lowest value trips or transit dependent trips?

#### TRANSIT EXTERNALITY ESTIMATES

EXTERNALITY GAP (Average PMT) \$0.16 to \$0.40 EXTERNALITY GAP (Average System) \$0.88 to \$1.09

Distortionary Tax Effect -8% to -15% of public expenditure

Public Health Charlotte: \$0.11, Stokes et al. (2007)

**Agglomeration Economies** 

Equity Concerns

Land Conservation

#### CONCLUSIONS

The net economic benefits of rail are highly dependent on the counterfactual without rail. 18 billion annual passenger miles need to be accounted for.

Nevertheless, investigating the externality gap provides guidance about which systems are likely to generate net economic benefits and which are not.

The findings support neither the contention that no rail systems have net economic benefits nor the contention that all do.

#### CONCLUSIONS

The majority of passenger miles appear likely to pass a costbenefit test, while the majority of systems do not.

Accounting for consumer surplus using a commonly applied elasticity of -0.3 and an assumed linear demand curve, two systems generate net economic benefits without accounting for any external benefits. Together, these systems provided 63% of the 24 systems' passenger miles in 2008.

One third of the systems, however, have an externality gap of over \$1.00 per PMT. These systems provided 4% of passenger miles in 2008.

At an elasticity of -1.0, eight systems have an externality gap lower than \$0.50 per passenger mile. Together, these systems accounted for 85% of passenger miles in 2008.



Elasticity and external costs and benefits likely vary by system. This will tend to reinforce the differences between the best and worst performing systems.

Choosing a discount rate for capital costs is highly subjective. Applying a higher rate will increase the average cost per passenger mile.

The counterfactual is unknowable, but the economic benefit of public investment in transit depends entirely it.